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Abstract: The current challenges posed by hate speech across the globe have prompted the need to better 
understand the evolution of the right to be free from the harm of hate speech as codified within Article 20(2) 
of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. This paper examines the right’s evolution within 
international human rights law (IHRL). Its purpose is to understand the core difficulties that have faced 
efforts geared to the development, strengthening and expansion of international standards that provide 
protection from the harm of hate speech. To elaborate upon such difficulties, the paper identifies four 
internal features of the right to be free from the harm of hate speech, representing the challenges facing its 
interpretation and implementation. These four features are the right’s ‘emotional’ component; the 
complexities in proving the proscribed incitement; the tensions between the listeners’ and speakers’ rights to 
liberty and equality; and the right’s group-identity component, which creates tensions between individual 
and group rights. The paper argues that these four internal features of the right have a strong and direct 
influence on understanding the difficult path the right has taken in its evolution within IHRL.
*
 
 
 
Both legal scholars and politicians have long been preoccupied with the challenge of reconciling 
the protection against hate speech with the safeguarding of fundamental freedoms, particularly 
freedom of expression. Nevertheless, the last few years have witnessed a new wave of public, 
political and academic debates regarding the basic questions and controversies underlying the 
legal regulation of hate speech. This regulation has taken on significant importance in the political 
agendas of many states across the globe, and has become among the most pressing, yet 
controversial, issues confronting international human rights law (IHRL). 
 
A number of significant developments have shed new light on the challenges of hate speech and 
have provided a new context for its existence and dissemination. First and foremost, as the result 
of the unprecedented rise in immigration flows, most modern societies have increasingly become 
more diverse racially, religiously and culturally. In many cases, this diversity has accompanied 
social anxieties and inter-groups tensions, which provide fertile ground for hate speech and 
exacerbate its harms. In addition, the exponentially accelerating advances in information and 
communication technologies (ICT) have unintentionally provided a strengthened infrastructure for 
the proliferation of hate speech with increasing potency, speed and visibility. With the effects of 
the geographical dimension of globalization (the rising immigration flows) and its virtual 
dimension (the ICT revolution), certain hate speech incidents can now grow from mere national 
crises into global crises with wide-ranging and cross-boundary repercussions.  
 
The contemporary features, manifestations and challenges of hate speech have drawn renewed 
attention to the international normative human rights framework on hate speech. Moreover, they 
have posed a number of questions: is a global answer in the law still needed, and is the 
international regulatory framework, as it currently stands, suitable to address the recent hate 
speech challenges? Or, on the other hand, does this framework need to be expanded in order to 
account for, and accurately reflect, the new globalized dynamics of hate speech. 
 
Against the background of the hate speech challenges proliferating in a globalizing world and the 
questions they pose regarding the current international normative framework on hate speech, this 
paper sheds light on how the norm against hate speech has evolved in IHRL. Specifically, it 
examines the norm’s evolution in three main aspects; its emergence in the ICCPR; the body of hate 
speech jurisprudence developed by supra-national monitoring and adjudicatory bodies; and the 
recent attempts in the UN to create new international standards on hate speech.  
                                                  
*
 This paper is based upon a PhD thesis “The right to be free from the harm of hate speech in international human rights 
law: An analysis of a difficult evolutionary path,” submitted to the University of Cambridge in September 2013.  The 
author would like to thank her supervisors Dr. Barbara Metzger and Dr. Sharath Srinivasan for their guidance throughout 
the process of writing the thesis as well as Dr. Thomas Probert for his editorial efforts on this paper. 
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This paper traces the norm’s evolution through the abovementioned three domains and more 
importantly explains the core challenges involved in this regard. It argues that four internal 
features of the right are instrumental in accounting for the challenges that have faced the 
development, strengthening and expansion of international standards providing protection against 
the harm of hate speech. These four internal features of the right are the ‘emotional’ component; 
the complexities of proving incitement; the tensions between speakers’ and listeners’ rights to 
liberty and equality; and the group-identity component. Through the lens of these four intrinsic 
qualities of the right, and by illuminating the definitional complexities and tensions underlying 
these qualities, this paper argues that they provoke enduring controversies pertaining to the 
right’s exact interpretation; furthermore, they limit its expansive potential.  
 
I. 
 
Article 20(2) of the ICCPR articulates the main and most comprehensive international standard 
that should guide states’ legal regulation of hate speech. The narrow conception of Article 20(2) 
that only deals with it as a limitation of the exercise of freedom of expression, rather than a 
codification of an autonomous right, is unjustified. This Article sets forth the right to be free from 
incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence resulting from the advocacy of national, racial, or 
religious hatred. This paper refers to that right using the abbreviated term ‘the right to be free 
from the harm of hate speech’ and argues that IHRL lexicon should recognize this right as such. 
 
In fact, the question of what valid justifications for recognizing specific claims as human rights has 
been subject to extensive philosophical, legal and political debates and remains contested. 
Traditionally, appeals have been made to natural law and the inherent dignity of human beings.1 
Currently, an increasing number of theorists focus on grounding rights in human interests.2 These 
theorists have suggested a wide range of interests, corresponding to different views of human life; 
however, there is a narrow margin of agreement among them on the valid criteria for determining 
when an interest deserves recognition as, or is sufficiently important to necessitate the 
formulation of, a human right.3 These debates need not be repeated here, since this paper uses 
the term ‘human rights’ in a technical and positivist sense: as a legal term of art, referring to those 
rights that international human rights instruments have codified.4 Through the political 
endorsement of states, these instruments validate and legitimize claims to protect specific 
interests and prevent certain harms. These instruments’ provisions elevate such claims to the 
status of international human rights and create a universal vocabulary to describe the normative 
content of the rights they have codified.5 While one might contest the theoretical or philosophical 
bases of international human rights instruments, these instruments remain to provide legal 
grounding for human rights protection.  
 
                                                  
1
 See Richard Tuck, Natural Rights Theories: Their Origin and Development (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1979). 
2
 John Tobin, The Right to Health in International Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 52. 
3
 Alon Harel, “What Demands Are Rights? An Investigation into the Relation Between Rights and Reasons,” Oxford 
Journal of Legal Studies 17, no. 1 (1997): 101–114; Tobin, The Right to Health in International Law, 51–53; James Griffin, 
On Human Rights (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 179–187; Amartya Sen, “Elements of a Theory of Human 
Rights,” Philosophy & Public Affairs 32, no. 4 (2004): 320–325; Allen Buchanan, “The Egalitarianism of Human Rights,” 
Ethics 120, no. 4 (July 2010): 120; Allen E Buchanan, Justice and Health Care Selected Essays (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2009), 213, http://public.eblib.com/EBLPublic/Public View.do?ptiID=472216. 
4
 David Feldman, Civil Liberties and Human Rights in England and Wales, 2nd ed. (Oxford: OUP, 2002), 5. 
5
 Samantha Besson, “Human Rights: Ethical, Political or Legal? First Steps in a Legal Theory of Human Rights,” in The Role 
of Ethics in International Law, ed. Donald Earl Childress (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 237; 
Tobin, The Right to Health in International Law, 46, 54, 58, 73–74. 
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The ICCPR stands at ‘the apex of human rights law’6 as ‘the most authoritative expression of the 
contemporary and universally accepted minimum standard of human rights.’7 The Covenant’s 
provisions proclaim and protect legal human rights as such, rather than important interests, 
concerns or aspirations.8States parties to the ICCPR are subject to legal obligations to respect, 
protect, and promote rights codified therein with regard to people within their jurisdiction. The 
present paper, through this positivist lens, recognizes the incorporation of Article 20(2) within the 
ICCPR as elevating the claim to be free from incitement to discrimination, hostility, or violence 
resulting from advocacy of hatred to the status of an international legal human right.  
 
The distinct formulation of Article 20(2), when compared to other provisions of the ICCPR, as well 
as the fact that it takes effect by shrinking the available zone of freedom of expression, should not 
lead to an automatic presupposition that the Article does not set forth an independent right. On 
the contrary, it is the protection of an independent right that distinguishes the Article’s 
formulation from other provisions within the ICCPR that allow states to impose interest-based 
limitations on rights without setting forth independent rights. According to those limitation 
provisions, states are granted discretionary power to apply limitations to the exercise of freedoms 
only as an option (i.e. these limitations are permissible, rather than mandatory, in nature). On the 
other hand, the mandatory nature of states’ obligations under Article 20(2) corresponds to its 
right-declaratory nature, whereby the interest in being protected, in an absolute manner, against 
the harm of hate speech carves out an independent right. The absolute prohibitions of torture and 
slavery under Articles 7 and 8 have been widely acknowledged in the IHRL lexicon as duties upon 
states that give rise to the rights to be free from torture and slavery.9 Similarly, the prohibition of 
incitement to discrimination, hostility, or violence is the duty that gives rise to the right to be free 
from the harm of hate speech (or acts as this right’s counterpart obligation).  
 
Furthermore, the autonomous presence of Article 20(2) in the Covenant’s text corresponds to its 
right-declaratory nature. This contrasts with the Covenant’s limitations provisions, which exist as 
sub-clauses within relevant articles. The free-standing status of Article 20(2) is also relevant to this 
nature, in that it indicates that once the Article’s threshold is met, it not only restricts freedom of 
expression, but also other freedoms (such as freedoms of religion and assembly). Article 20(2) also 
entails a negative claim vis-à-vis the state, similar to other right-declaratory articles of the 
Covenant. Though it might appear prima facie as incorporating only a positive claim vis-à-vis the 
state to enact laws that prohibit the expressive acts described therein, Article 20(2) obliges the 
state to refrain from engaging in advocacy of hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination, 
hostility, or violence. Indeed, the laws that should be enacted pursuant to Article 20(2) apply 
equally to private persons and state organs.10 
 
As a consequence of the inclusion of Article 20(2) within the text of the ICCPR, the protection from 
incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence represents not only a societal or public interest 
that enhances the values of tolerance, mutual respect and dignity, but is also properly 
characterized as an international human right. The Article imposes rights-based, not merely 
interest-based, limitations on the exercise of freedoms. This distinction has clear practical 
consequences. While the violation of a right provides grounds (uncontested by theories of rights) 
                                                  
6
 Rosalyn Higgins, “The United Nations: Still a Force for Peace,” The Modern Law Review 52, no. 1 (1989): 1. 
7
 Manfred Nowak, U.N. Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: CCPR commentary, 2nd ed. (Kehl, Germany; Arlington, Va., 
USA: N.P. Engel, 2005), xi. 
8
 Alon Harel, “What Demands Are Rights? An Investigation into the Relation Between Rights and Reasons,” 113. 
9
 Nowak, U.N. Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 157,194. 
10
 “Human Rights Committee, General Comment 11 on Article 20 (Nineteenth Session, 1983), Reprinted in Compilation 
of General Comments and General Recommendations Adopted by Human Rights Treaty Bodies, U.N. Doc. 
HRI/GEN/1/Rev.6 at 133 (2003).,” n.d., para. 2; Nowak, U.N. Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 475. 
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for restricting the exercise of liberties, the protection of public or societal interests does not 
necessarily enjoy the same legitimate status. Moreover, at the adjudication level, the protection of 
public interests is not always prioritised over the protection of rights; precedence is granted to the 
right unless there is a compelling reason or danger above a certain degree of severity for an 
interest to trump a right.11 Courts must apply ‘an elaborate, sophisticated and rather strict test of 
justification’ when a fundamental right is at stake in a specific case, while they tend to adopt ‘a 
highly relaxed and deferential approach’ when ‘a “mere” individual interest is at stake.’12 Interests 
that have not been elevated to the status of human rights ‘will be less carefully scrutinized’ than 
interests that have acquired such a status.13 Treating Article 20(2) of the ICCPR as a simple 
additional limitation to the exercise of freedom of expression would require ascertaining the 
acceptable limits that may be imposed on freedom of expression when protecting the interest to 
be free from the harm of hate speech, at the adjudication level. In contrast, the recognition of that 
interest as a right would require that adjudicatory bodies, while considering hate speech cases, 
not just determine the limits of freedom of expression but also to strike a balance and resolve 
tensions between these two fundamental rights (and possibly other rights, as well, including 
freedoms of religion and assembly).  
 
The right codified by Article 20(2) falls most precisely under the ambit of rights that ‘maximize the 
utility of freedoms’ than under the ambit of rights that ‘maximize the range of freedoms’.14The 
right to be free from the harm of hate speech enhances and facilitates the enjoyment of the 
fundamental rights to individual dignity and equality that run like a red thread throughout IHRL 
instruments.15The principle affirmed in Article 5 of the ICCPR that ‘no one may engage in an 
activity aimed at destroying the rights of others’16 also provides the rationale for the right to be 
free from the harm of hate speech, given that it prohibits the abuse of freedom of expression with 
the aim of enhancing the rights of others.17 
 
 
II.  
 
Bringing together four specific internal features of the right to be free from the harm of hate 
speech and analysing their combined effect on the right’s difficult evolution provides useful 
insights into the major challenges involved in this regard. Moreover, these insights prove useful 
beyond the confines of the international legal regulation of this issue. Indeed, any legal system 
that provides protection against the harm of hate speech, whether at the national, regional or 
                                                  
11
 Eva Brems, “Introduction,” in Conflict Between Fundamental Rights, ed. Eva Brems (Intersentia, 2008), 2; Janneke H. 
Gerards, “Fundamental Rights and Other Interests: Should It Really Make a Difference?,” in Conflict Between 
Fundamental Rights, ed. Eva Brems (Intersentia, 2008), 688. 
12
 Gerards, “Fundamental Rights and Other Interests,” 680. 
13
 Ibid., 688. 
14
 Feldman, Civil Liberties and Human Rights, 13;Feldman uses these categories to distinguish between negative rights 
and positive rights.Feldman, Civil Liberties and Human Rights, 13 
15
 Nowak, U.N. Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 474; Karl Josef Partsch, “Freedom of Conscience and Expression, 
and Political Freedoms,” in The International Bill of Rights: The Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, ed. Louis Henkin 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1981), 229; Scott J. Catlin, “Proposal for Regulating Hate Speech in the United 
States:  Balancing Rights Under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,” Notre Dame Law Review 69 
(1994 1993): 795,810; David Kretzmer, “Freedom of Speech and Racism,” Cardozo Law Review 8 (1987 1986): 467; 
Andrew Altman, “Freedom of Expression and Human Rights Law: The Case of Holocaust Denial,” in Speech and Harm: 
Controversies over Free Speech, ed. Ishani Maitra and Mary Kathryn McGowan (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 
31. 
16
 “International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, UNGA Resolution 2200A (XXI), December 16, 1966, 21 UNGAOR 
Supp. (No.16) at52, UN Doc. A/6316 (1966), 999 UNTS 171, Entered into Force March 23, 1976,” n.d., Article 5. 
17
 Nazila Ghanea, “Expression and Hate Speech in the ICCPR: Compatible or Clashing?,” Religion and Human Rights 5, no. 
2–3 (2010): 177–178; Stephanie Farrior, “Molding the Matrix: The Historical and Theoretical Foundations of 
International Law Concerning Hate Speech,” Berkeley Journal of International Law 14 (1996): 4–5. 
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international level, has to grapple with the interpretation and implementation challenges 
besetting these four features of the norm against hate speech. 
 
The right’s first internal feature, its ‘emotional’ component, manifests itself in the nature of the 
prohibited expressions, as well as the nature of one category of harms that justify such 
prohibition. More precisely, the right obliges states to make their national laws intolerant of an 
extreme emotion, which is hatred, if its advocacy incites, inter alia, hostility, which is an emotional 
harm. In this sense, the key terms ‘hatred’ and ‘hostility’ construct the meaning of the right to be 
free from the harm of hate speech. However, they are unrelated to concrete practice, instead 
connecting to invisible occurrences that concern the states of minds, attitudes and psychological 
states of abhorrence, detestation and enmity. The right’s ‘emotional’ component renders the clear 
and objective definition of the right in the context of IHRL a difficult task. Furthermore, this 
‘emotional’ component represents the right’s relativist challenge, as emotive states are rooted in 
conceptions of morals – which, in turn, encompass relativity and change; they shift through time 
and vary from place to place. In contrast to physical or bodily harms, international norms that 
provide protection from emotional harms are less likely to ‘resonate transnationally’.18 
 
The right’s second feature is the difficulty of proving the causal relationship between advocacy of 
hatred and its alleged harms. This causal relationship is indirect, cumulative, and mentally and 
emotionally mediated and thus proves difficult to precisely or empirically establish and measure. 
The complexities of proving the inciting nature of advocacy of hatred pose a considerable 
challenge to the interpretation and enforceability of the right to be free from the harm of hate 
speech. Furthermore, the incitement component of the right represents an additional relativist 
challenge to its interpretation, as the nature and strength of the causal relationship between 
speech and its alleged harms is contextual: the prevailing wider social environment and historical 
context shape both the meaning and impact of speech. Notably, international norms that do not 
entail ‘a short and clear causal chain’ connecting the source of harms to the harms themselves are 
less likely to cross cultures and acquire wide international agreement.19 
 
The interpretation and implementation of the right to be free from the harm of hate speech 
require striking a very delicate balance between the speakers’ and listeners’ rights to equality and 
liberty; these tensions represent the right’s third feature. These tensions are not, as they might 
appear prima facie and as the academic literature widely describes, between the two values of 
liberty and equality in the abstract. Rather, they occur between the interests of listeners and 
speakers in both values. The involvement of the two values (liberty and equality) in the right is 
multifaceted and complex. The right takes effect by restricting the speakers’ freedom of 
expression. Yet liberty as a value is not enhanced only through the protection of a wider range of 
expressions; liberty can be at risk for the listeners if they are not provided protection against the 
harms of hate speech, as hate speech can have a ‘silencing effect’ on them. Enhancing the equality 
of listeners is the major underlying rationale of the right. However, equality as a value can be at 
stake for the speakers if their exercise of freedom of expression is unwarrantedly infringed upon. 
Thus the interpretation and implementation of the right should not be reduced to solving 
perceived tensions or even conflicts between equality and liberty and then giving primacy to one 
value over the other. Instead, the right’s interpretation and implementation involve striking a 
difficult balance between the speakers’ and listeners’ interests in enjoying their liberty and 
equality rights. 
                                                  
18
 Margaret E. Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, “Transnational Advocacy Networks in International and Regional Politics,” 1999, 
99, http://isites.harvard.edu/fs/docs/icb.topic446176.files/Week_7/Keck_and_Sikkink_Transnational_Advocacy.pdf; See 
also Darren Hawkins, “Explaining Costly International Institutions: Persuasion and Enforceable Human Rights Norms,” 
International Studies Quarterly 48, no. 4 (2004): 779. 
19
 Keck and Sikkink, “Transnational Advocacy Networks in International and Regional Politics,” 98–99. 
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Moreover, the right has a group-identity aspect. Both the hateful content and the harms of 
expressions prohibited are those targeting three specific collective identities: national origin, race, 
and religion. The group-identity component of the right makes the right embody another source of 
tension between individual and group rights, representing the right’s fourth internal feature. This 
feature questions whether the right protects only individual members of the three identified 
groups or protects these groups as such from collective harms, as well. Drawing a sharp dividing 
line between the two categories of protection (the individualized and the collective) entails an 
evident difficulty given that hate speech targets people based on their group-defining 
characteristic(s) or identity. The group-identity component of the right also raises the dilemma of 
how to distinguish between the protection of groups from the collective harms of hate speech and 
the protection of the group-defining characteristic(s) given the blurred lines separating both kinds 
of protection. This dilemma has become more visible and contentious recently, especially in 
regards to religious hate speech, as it significantly affects the scope of prohibited expressions 
pursuant to the right. The fact that the right is a fusion of individual and collective elements thus 
poses evident challenges to its interpretation and definition. 
 
There are interconnections between the definitional uncertainties and tensions that underlie the 
four internal features of the right. The ‘emotional’ component of the right further compounds the 
difficulties involved in proving and defining incitement, while these two features of the right 
complicate the resolution of the two sources of tensions that beset it. In addition, addressing the 
right’s definitional uncertainties becomes more difficult given its underlying tensions. These 
tensions are reconciled differently, reflecting biases regarding conceptions of or approaches to 
rights. This, in turn, leads to varied definitions of the right’s key terms, and consequently to 
different delineations of its exact meaning and scope. Since the regulation of hate speech involves 
accommodating the ideas of formal and substantive notions of equality and autonomy as well as 
individual and group rights, the libertarian and egalitarian conceptions of freedom of expression as 
well as the individualist and communitarian approaches to rights largely inform and guide the 
right’s various modes of interpretation and implementation.  
 
The right to be free from the harm of hate speech as codified in IHRL requires positive state action, 
in the form of enactment of necessary laws, (rather than just the non-interference of states) and 
takes effect through limiting the legitimate zone of expressions available to speakers in order to 
do justice to the equality principle. Furthermore, the right recognizes both emotional and 
tangible/physical harms of hate speech as well as group-based harms. Thus the right aligns with 
the egalitarian notion of freedom of expression, which recognizes a wide range of harms, including 
non-physical harms, that justify the restriction of hate speech by the state in order to respect the 
equality principle. The right also aligns with the communitarian approach to rights, which seeks to 
protect group identities and safeguard group rights. On the other hand, the strictly libertarian-
individualist approach to rights greets the right to be free from the harm of hate speech 
sceptically. This approach holds that the state’s prohibition of hate speech is generally an 
impermissible restriction upon the content of speech, except when the speech is directed toward 
an individual under circumstances in which an immediate violent or lawless act is likely to result. 
Strong biases regarding the libertarian-individualist approach to rights are irreconcilable with the 
approach endorsed by IHRL in regulating hate speech.  
 
The analysis of the four internal features of the right to be free from the harm of hate speech 
indicates that the shift from moral denunciation to legal prohibition of hate speech at the 
international level entails inherent interpretive and implementation challenges. These challenges 
are evident when defining the content of prohibited speech, proving its causal relationship with 
proscribed harms, resolving tensions between the speakers’ and listeners’ rights to liberty and 
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equality, and resolving tensions between individual and group rights. The major areas of 
contention among states in conceiving the meaning of the right have their basis in different 
approaches to addressing the definitional uncertainties and tensions underlying the right’s four 
internal features. Moreover, these definitional complexities and tensions represent the major 
obstacles confronting the consolidation of supra-national hate speech jurisprudence. Thus, the 
four internal features of the right to be free from the harm of hate speech render it challenging for 
the right to acquire a universal, definite and consensual meaning. These controversies and 
complexities are traced in the three main domains of the right’s journey in IHRL.  
 
 
III. 
 
An analysis of the drafting history of the ICCPR’s Article 20(2) gives rise to an examination of the 
emergence of the right to be free from the harm of hate speech in IHRL. The obvious links 
between hate propaganda and the grave human rights violations committed before and during 
WWII against particular groups drove the international legal regulation of hate speech. Article 
20(2) was largely triggered by the tragic impact of Nazi and Fascist ideologies and policies 
(specifically, their hateful and racist propaganda), and the desire to prevent the resurgence of 
similar extreme ideologies. Moreover, the drafting of Article 20(2) took place against the 
ideological polarization between the East and West during the Cold War. It was promoted mostly 
by states belonging to or allied with the Eastern bloc and was resisted mostly by states belonging 
to the Western bloc.  
 
The travaux preparatoires of Article 20(2) were characterized by considerable controversy: not 
only was the delineation of the Article’s exact scope controversial, but its very inclusion in the 
ICCPR was similarly debatable. The states that opposed the Article’s perceived it as failing to set 
forth a human right, but rather just as imposing unwarranted restrictions on freedom of 
expression. Thus, they believed that the Article did not fall under the Covenant’s substantive 
scope. They conceived of the ICCPR as an instrument that should set forth only individual rights of 
a negative nature, entailing the non-interference of states. On the other hand, the states that 
supported the Article perceived it as indispensible for establishing a new post-war world order. 
They held that protection against the denial and abuses of human rights should be guaranteed for 
every human being and should in itself constitute a recognizable right in IHRL.  
 
The polarized positions of the Article’s supporters and opponents during the drafting phase were 
mainly related to the four internal features of the right to be free from the harm of hate speech. 
Concern about the perceived tensions between states’ obligations under Article 20(2) and 
freedom of expression permeated the Article’s drafting history. Both supporters and opponents 
resorted to the logic of abuse to justify their positions. The former warned against the abuse of 
the exercise of freedom of expression and viewed the Article as a preventive tool to provide 
protection to individuals and groups against discrimination. The latter, on the other hand, warned 
against the abuse of limitations on the fundamental freedom of expression in a manner that could 
lead to jeopardizing it; they viewed the Article as an abusive tool in itself. 
 
The Article’s drafting history indicates the split among states regarding whether IHRL should 
provide protection against the emotional harms of hate speech. Objections arose, mainly from 
Western states, to the use of the terms ‘hatred’ and ‘hostility’ in the Article, on the basis that the 
terms defy objective legal definitions and are highly susceptible to abuse by states that might 
impose unwarranted restrictions on freedom of expression. Western states tried to narrow the 
scope of harms justifying prohibiting advocacy of hatred as much as possible, and called for 
restricting this scope to the incitement to violence alone. They resisted specifying legal means with 
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which to address hate speech and regarded such specification as approaching legislating morality. 
Western states affirmed that the particularities of national contexts, especially histories, legal 
traditions and political cultures shape national approaches to addressing hate speech, and might 
not necessarily be legal in nature. The Article’s supporters, however, insisted that IHRL provides 
protection against a broader range of harms resulting from advocacy of hatred. They regarded 
incitement to hatred or to hostility as equally dangerous as incitement to violence, on the basis 
that the latter usually takes root in the former, and held that the serious repercussions of the 
former incitements meant that these incitements deserve to be prohibited by law across states.  
 
The multiplicity of states’ understandings regarding the meaning of the Article’s terms and 
rationale make the recourse to its travaux preparatoires, as a supplementary interpretive tool, not 
conclusively determinative of the Article’s exact meaning. The voting record on the Article at the 
UN, where it was adopted with 50 states in favour, 18 against and 15 abstentions, indicates that 
the wide and deep disagreements among states on both the Article’s objectives and means of 
achieving them, had not been resolved during negotiations. The right to be free from the harm of 
hate speech was thus the product of a fragile international agreement and was codified within 
IHRL without a shared understanding of how to address its definitional uncertainties and 
underlying tensions.  
 
 
IV. 
 
In light of the many definitional or conceptual ambiguities and inherent tensions that the right to 
be free from the harm of hate speech embodies, the development and refinement of supra-
national interpretive jurisprudence is crucial in understanding the right’s exact meaning and scope. 
Despite the fact that Article 20(2) of the ICCPR imposes a strict liability on states, the Human 
Rights Committee (HRCttee), as the body designated with the task of interpreting the Covenant, 
has not met the challenge of clarifying its exact threshold. The Committee did not develop clear 
criteria for defining the Article’s key terms, particularly ‘hatred’, ‘hostility’, and ‘incitement’. The 
first term describes the substantive content of expressions that fall under the Article’s scope; the 
second describes one category of the harms that justify prohibiting these expressions; and the 
third is crucial in activating and enforcing the right through proving causation between expressions 
and their alleged harms. The HRCttee was unable to determine, or deliberately avoided 
determining, the exact normative content and scope of the right to be free from the harm of hate 
speech, and how exactly to delineate its legal contours in relation to freedom of expression. 
 
The HRCttee was prone to regard the main legal issues that arose within the context of hate 
speech through the lens of freedom of expression, rather than the right to be free from the harm 
of hate speech. In the few individual communications on hate speech which it considered, the 
major question driving its legal reasoning was whether Article 19 protected the expressions 
involved. The HRCttee did not adopt separate legal tests to assess whether these expressions met 
the threshold of Article 20(2). Instead, the Committee employed the Article only as an additional 
or supplementary element to inform or reinforce legitimate conditions for restricting freedom of 
expression, particularly ‘the protection of the rights and reputation of others’ and ‘necessity’. 
Overall, the HRCttee’s hate speech jurisprudence has left the right to be free from the harm of 
hate speech ill-defined and vague (both with respect to its normative core, and as a corollary, as to 
what constitutes a violation).  
 
Similar to the HRCttee, the Committee on Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD) and the 
European Court on Human Rights (ECtHR) have avoided articulating the essential definitional 
elements of the key terms integral to hate speech adjudication, in particular hatred and 
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incitement. They avoided being constrained in their reasoning by definitions which could limit 
their power of action in subsequent cases. The available body of supra-national hate speech 
jurisprudence has not provided a principled assessment of the qualification of certain expressions 
as advocating hatred, nor did they provide a systematic method for identifying incitement for the 
purpose of restricting the exercise of freedom of expression.  
 
The HRCttee and the ECtHR have taken a cautious supra-national scrutiny approach to hate 
speech. They conceived of national authorities as best positioned to demarcate the boundary 
between free speech and hate speech, particularly regarding the qualification of the nature of 
prohibited expressions and the assessment of their likelihood to cause harms (their inciting 
nature). The analysis of causation in supra-national hate speech jurisprudence reflects a conviction 
that such causation is largely contingent upon national contexts. This body of jurisprudence is 
largely unhelpful in determining the exact elements that should characterize national laws that 
provide protection against the harms of hate speech. Moreover, it has thus far failed to develop 
clear legal tests to guide national adjudicatory bodies in interpreting and implementing hate 
speech laws. Supra-national hate speech jurisprudence indicates that when it comes to 
concretizing the right to be free from the harm of hate speech and balancing it against other rights 
or interests, states enjoy wide discretion. A variety of national approaches to the formulation and 
application of hate speech laws could be regarded as compatible with the basic guarantee of 
providing protection against hate speech. This was true also of the ECtHR’s jurisprudence, though 
a higher level of homogeneity exists among the legal traditions and cultures of states parties to 
the ECHR. 
 
The absence of a consolidated and comprehensive body of supra-national hate speech 
jurisprudence has been largely influenced by the four internal features of the norm against hate 
speech. Emotional harms have been recognized as grounds for restricting hate speech, however, 
the norm’s emotional component has hampered the articulation of objective and clear definitions 
of the key terms involved in hate speech adjudication, particularly ‘hatred’ and ‘hostility’. 
Moreover, this emotional component is largely responsible for the relaxed scrutiny approach that 
supra-national human rights monitoring bodies follow, as it introduces the element of legal 
moralism into hate speech regulation. Notably, these bodies have traditionally avoided giving clear 
directions to states regarding the protection of morals as legitimate grounds for restricting the 
exercise of freedoms, on the basis that the notion of morals should be contextually interpreted.  
 
Furthermore, the nature of the causal relationship between advocacy of hatred and its alleged 
harms (which is indirect, cumulative, belief-mediated and highly contingent upon context), 
explains the difficulties these supra-national bodies have encountered in defining the threshold of 
incitement for the purposes of restricting hate speech. The complexities involved in proving 
incitement have also driven these bodies to adopt, to a large extent, the national authorities’ 
assessments of how tightly the causal relationship between advocacy of hatred and its actual or 
potential harms must be drawn before restricting the exercise of freedom of expression. Notably, 
the CERD’s more proactive interpretive approach, when compared to that of the HRCttee, can be 
understood in light of the fact that the prohibition of racist hate speech under the ICERD does not 
involve the complexities of proving a causal relationship between racist statements and their 
alleged harms. The ICERD prohibits the mere act of disseminating racist ideas, without the need 
for qualifiers of intention, advocacy, or incitement. 
 
Supra-national monitoring and adjudicatory bodies have been largely unable to provide clear 
guidance to states on the reconciliation of the two main sources of tensions underlying the 
regulation of hate speech. These bodies have elaborated upon the right to be free from the harm 
of hate speech only as an additional legitimate limitation to freedom of expression, rather than as 
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an autonomous substantive right. They confronted tensions between speakers’ and listeners’ 
rights to equality and liberty that have hampered the articulation of strictly defined parameters or 
stringent tests to identify the threshold between freedom of expression and prohibited hate 
speech in supra-national jurisprudence. The complex and multifaceted involvement of the two 
fundamental values (liberty and equality) within the right to be free from the harm of hate speech 
has prompted supra-national monitoring bodies to adopt almost a purely case-based and context-
based approach in adjudicating hate speech cases rather than articulating clear principles on how 
to balance the competing rights of speakers and listeners. These bodies have not acknowledged 
that they need to reach beyond a case-by-case approach. 
 
Regarding the tensions between individual and group rights, supra-national bodies have 
recognized harms to groups as such, not only to their individual members, as justifying the 
imposition of restrictions on hate speech. The jurisprudence of these bodies aligns with group 
rights approach to protection against the harm of hate speech, rather than the strictly individualist 
approach. However, the delicate issue of distinguishing between the incitement to hatred against 
groups and the incitement to hatred against group-defining characteristic(s) remains largely 
unclear in the available jurisprudence despite the issue’s rising relevance to contemporary hate 
speech challenges (especially in the context of religious hate speech). The incitement to hatred 
against groups, the incitement to hatred against the individual members of groups, and the 
incitement to hatred against or the denigration of group-defining characteristic represent, at the 
abstract level, separate analytical categories of expressive acts. However, religious, racial or 
national hatred actually refers to hatred against a group of persons defined by reference to (or 
centred around) religious belief, racial identity, or national origin, which raises doubts about 
whether a line could clearly be drawn between protecting groups or their individual members 
from incitement and protecting their identity from denigration or defamation. Moreover, in 
reality, there are overlaps and commonalities between these categories of expressive acts. Many 
groups perceive contempt or insult of their identities as amounting to incitement to hatred against 
them and to group defamation since they identify themselves primarily by their group identities. 
Also, expressions that are construed as denigrating particular group identities are frequently used 
as a pretext to incite hatred, discrimination or violence against groups in an indirect manner. The 
group-identity component of the right to be free from the harm of hate speech or in other words 
the fact that the right is integral to the promotion of collective goals, the prevention of communal 
harms, and the protection of groups’ identities explains the difficulty encountered by supra-
national bodies in making the distinction between the incitement to hatred against groups and the 
incitement to hatred against group-defining characteristic.  
 
The analysis of the case law of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) reveals that 
the difficulties confronting the consolidation of case law on incitement to genocide are less 
complex than those confronting the consolidation of case law on the right to be free from the 
harm of hate speech (given that genocide is the most public and extreme manifestation of 
violence and relevant case law came in response to its actual, rather than possible, occurrence). 
However, the difficulties confronting the two bodies of jurisprudence are not entirely distinct from 
each other. In both instances, the internal features of respective norms resonate (in particular the 
emotional component and the incitement component), leading to definitional uncertainties and 
complexities in proving causation between speech and its alleged harms. 
 
These various interpretational gaps and weaknesses within the body of supra-national hate speech 
jurisprudence make it hard to determine when a violation has occurred in any given circumstance 
and as a consequence, when the right to be free from the harm of hate speech can be claimed 
before a court or a relevant monitoring body. Furthermore, they are not conducive to the long-
term development or refinement of the right in IHRL.  
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V. 
 
The analysis of recent efforts to develop the right within the UN also provides an important 
window through which the right and its associated dynamics can be assessed. There were 
persistent efforts during the last decade within the HRC that focused on developing new 
international standards on hate speech. These standard-setting efforts were led by Islamic states 
and supported by most African states; they started with a series of UN resolutions on combating 
defamation of religions that were successfully adopted from 1999 to 2010. These resolutions 
aimed to recognize the prohibition of defamation of religions as an international human right 
norm that should enjoy significant political and legal weight. However, given the non-binding 
nature of these resolutions, Islamic states regarded them as insufficient to fully address their 
concerns. They decided to redouble their efforts through the 2006 establishment of the UN Ad 
Hoc Committee on the Elaboration of Complementary Standards, which had the explicit mandate 
of creating new international binding standards on incitement to racial and religious hatred. The 
standards that Islamic states proposed aimed mainly to oblige states to prohibit by law the 
negative stereotyping and defamation of religions, as well as the derogatory profiling and 
stigmatization of both individuals and groups on the basis of religion. Islamic states first resorted 
to Article 20(2) to legitimize their suggested non-binding standards within resolutions on 
combating defamation of religions. They framed these resolutions as falling under the ambit of the 
right to be free from the harm of hate speech. Subsequently, they contended that the Article had 
normative gaps, and focused on the need to address such gaps through the development of new 
international binding standards complementary to Article 20(2).  
 
While the Eastern bloc mainly initiated the codification of the right to be free from the harm of 
hate speech in IHRL in response to the atrocities committed before and during WWII, in recent 
years, Islamic states have led international advocacy efforts on the issue. These states were 
prompted to address the rising manifestations of Islamophobia in the West, especially in the 
aftermath of 9/11, with the creation of new international standards on religious hate speech. 
Conversely, Western states have historically been the main opponents to efforts aiming to 
regulate hate speech under IHRL. During the 1950s and 1960s, they resisted the codification of the 
right to be free from the harm of hate speech in IHRL and sought to narrow the scope of Article 
20(2) of the ICCPR as much as possible. Western states have also been the main opponents to the 
recent efforts aiming to further expand the international norm against hate speech over the last 
decade. 
 
Islamic states’ suggested standards for religious hate speech sought to realign the normative 
scope of the right to be free from the harm of hate speech through the direct intervention with 
the four internal features of that right. First, the suggested standards expanded the ‘emotional’ 
component of the right by providing protection to the feelings of religious adherents and by 
recognizing offence and insult to them as legitimate grounds for imposing restrictions on freedom 
of expression. Second, they recognized an automatic causal relationship between defamation of 
religions or offensiveness to religious feelings on the one hand, and incitement to discrimination, 
hostility or violence against religious adherents on the other. The suggested standards read an 
implication of the right to be free from religious defamation in the original right to be free from 
the harm of hate speech. By implying this right, the suggested standards overlooked the 
difficulties in proving the causal relationship between advocacy of religious hatred and its alleged 
harms. Third, the Islamic states’ proposed standards lowered the threshold of the legitimate 
exercise of freedom of expression for speakers by adding the respect of religions, their symbols 
and sacred personalities, and the respect of religious feelings as legitimate grounds for restricting 
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freedom of expression. Fourth, the suggested standards expanded the protection accorded to 
religious groups and their identities from hate speech in a manner inclusive of their group-defining 
characteristic, religion. These proposed standards’ objects of protection were not simply religious 
adherents, but also religions themselves. This expansion of the group-identity aspect of the right 
to be free from the harm of hate speech reflects the Islamic states’ conviction of the inseparability 
of incitement that targets followers of religions and that which targets the defamation of religions.  
 
The opponents of the standard-setting agenda, on the other hand, decoupled the standards 
suggested by Islamic states from the scope of Article 20(2). They rejected the proposed standards’ 
intervention with the normative content and scope of the right to be free from the harm of hate 
speech under IHRL, in particular rejecting the addition of the prohibition of defamation of religions 
as falling under the ambit of the right. The opponents of the suggested standards considered the 
latter an infringement on the legitimate exercise of freedom of expression. They emphasized that 
religions do not warrant protection under IHRL, which protects only the rights of individuals, and 
that those rights do not include the right to be free from insults or offences to religion. The 
opponents of the standard-setting agenda held that the Islamic states’ proposals, if adopted, 
would negatively impact the international human rights system itself by distorting the IHRL’s focus 
on individuals. Moreover, they contended that the current IHRL framework lacks any normative 
gaps and is sufficient to address contemporary hate speech challenges. 
 
Historical and contemporary analyses of states’ positions on how to address hate speech within 
IHRL help to highlight the elements of continuity and change in the areas of contention involved. A 
clear element of continuity has permeated these discussions: the major areas of contention 
among states that arose during the drafting of Article 20(2) of the ICCPR more than 60 years ago 
are in many ways similar to those arising during contemporary standard-setting efforts on hate 
speech. States’ different positions in both phases stemmed from their different perceptions of 
how to address the definitional uncertainties and tensions underlying the four internal features of 
the right to be free from the harm of hate speech. However, since recent standard-setting 
attempts focused on the religious ground of hate speech, new controversial aspects of the right to 
be free from the harm of hate speech were brought to the fore. The relationship between 
freedom of religion and the right to be free from the harm of hate speech featured prominently in 
recent debates. In addition, the question of whether religious hate speech should be addressed as 
a contemporary manifestation of racism was at the heart of the new wave of inter-state debates 
on the right to be free from the harm of hate speech.  
 
Islamic states did not simply draw an analogy between defamation of religions and incitement to 
religious hatred, discrimination or violence. Rather, their standards assumed an automatic causal 
relationship between defamation of religions and negative profiling of religious adherents on the 
one hand, and the infringement upon religious freedoms of believers and racism against them on 
the other. They highlighted that defamation of Islam has de facto infringed upon the rights of 
Muslims in the West to express and practise their religion. Islamic states also remarked upon the 
use of religious hate speech as a pretext for expressing hatred against Muslim communities in the 
West, on the basis of their racial or ethnic identities and not only their religious identity. The two 
appeals made by Islamic states to freedom of religion and the fight against racism to legitimize 
their standards further complicated standard-setting attempts. The opponents of the standard-
setting agenda considered the Islamic states’ suggested standards as a remodelling of the scope of 
freedom of religion and racism under IHRL. They excluded any causal relationship between 
defamation of religion and the violation of religious freedoms of believers and their subjection to 
racism. The causal relationship among these four different analytic categories (defamation of 
religions; incitement to religious hatred, discrimination or violence; violation of religious freedoms; 
and racism against believers) is not necessarily inevitable nor absolutely impossible. Instead, the 
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interconnection, including possible practical overlaps and links, of these four analytic categories 
should be empirically examined without predetermined or fixed assumptions, rather than 
conceived of in strictly normative or conceptual terms. No single determination can be made in 
abstracto on such complex matters.  
 
The recent standard-setting efforts in the area of religious hate speech have created tensions at 
the level of multilateral human rights diplomacy between Islamic states and Western states. These 
tensions resulted not only from polarized positions on the need and desirability of creating new 
standards, but they were also exacerbated by the fact that Islamic states framed their suggested 
standards as a response to the deteriorating situation of Muslim minorities in the West. The 
statements made by Islamic states regarding the debates on standard-setting within the UN took 
an accusatory tone towards the West. These states aimed to exert political pressure on Western 
states to address the rising manifestations of Islamophobia, and to expose what they perceived to 
be rights deficits or protection gaps in the areas of minority rights, racism and xenophobia in the 
West.  
 
After several rounds of diplomatic standoffs in the HRC during the last decade, the gaps between 
the supporters and opponents became too wide to bridge, and efforts aiming to develop 
international standards on hate speech ultimately reached an impasse. This paper has highlighted 
the role played by the composition and capacities of supporters and opponents in the failure of 
recent standard-setting efforts in the area of religious hate speech. Islamic states, supported by 
most African states, were the only supporters of standard-setting efforts. Islamic states failed to 
expand the support for their efforts from either other states or other members of the 
international law-making community (as NGOs or UN Special Rapporteurs or other independent 
human rights experts). In contrast, the opponents were much more effective than the supporters 
in advancing their normative agendas. In addition to Western states, the opponents included a 
number of Asian and Latin American states as well as active and dynamic international and 
national NGOs. The opponents, particularly the US, played a significant role, by investing political 
and diplomatic capital and exerting political pressure, in obstructing the standard-setting efforts. 
They first gradually reduced the level of support for these efforts by other states, and then pushed 
the Islamic states to freeze their initiatives. 
 
Debates within the UN on resolutions on combating defamation of religions, as well as debates 
within the Ad Hoc Committee’s sessions, have stimulated further intense debates on Article 20(2) 
of the ICCPR and have ultimately changed its dormant status within IHRL. Despite the greater 
visibility that the Article has acquired over the last decade, the standard-setting efforts in the area 
of religious hate speech exposed a polarized and confrontational reading of the Article as highly 
controversial within the edifice of the ICCPR. States’ positions reflected the lack of a common 
understanding of the rationale and meaning of the right to be free from the harm of hate speech, 
in terms of both the nature of prohibited expressions pursuant to it and the location of the 
threshold for prohibiting freedom of expression. States’ differences on how to address hate 
speech within IHRL stem from their polarized conceptions of the four internal features of the right 
to be free from the harm of hate speech. Such polarized perceptions of the four intrinsic qualities 
of the international norm against hate speech also belie the failure of the majority of states to 
reach an agreement regarding the further development of this norm in IHRL.   
 
While early negotiations on the codification of the right to be free from the harm of hate speech in 
IHRL ended in the adoption of Article 20(2) of the ICCPR based on a fragile international 
agreement, the latest negotiations on the international norm against hate speech have reached an 
impasse. 
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The evolution of the international norm against hate speech within IHRL has faced significant 
difficulties and appears to be almost frozen in a specific frame. The right to be free from the harm 
of hate speech clearly presents a challenge to IHRL. States’ polarized readings of the meaning of 
the right emerged early in the right’s codification, surfacing in the period from 1947-1961 during 
the negotiations surrounding the drafting of Article 20(2) of the ICCPR. Furthermore, states’ 
polarized understanding of the right has also manifested itself in the last decade during attempts 
to create additional international standards on hate speech in the UN. The significant 
controversies that characterized the drafting of Article 20(2) had not been reconciled by the time 
of the Covenant’s adoption, while the latest standard-setting efforts to expand the right’s 
normative content ended in a prolonged stalemate. While the history of the right’s negotiations 
and the recent negotiations to further develop it demonstrate a considerable gap among states in 
their understanding of the right’s rationale and scope, international jurisprudence has not helped 
to fill this gap. The body of hate speech jurisprudence that supra-national monitoring and 
adjudicatory bodies have developed has contributed very little to the elaboration of the normative 
content of the right, leaving a broad spectrum for states’ discretionary interpretations. Thus, the 
exact normative core and scope of the international human right to be free from the harm of hate 
speech, as captured in the text of the ICCPR, continue to be contested, lacking a universal or 
consensual meaning. The right has not yet transformed into a common or shared understanding of 
its exact normative content among states, nor has it developed into specific standards within 
supra-national jurisprudence to guide its worldwide interpretation and effective implementation. 
 
 
VI. 
 
The analysis provided in this paper on the emergence of the right to be free from the harm of hate 
speech in IHRL, its interpretive supra-national jurisprudence, and recent efforts to expand its 
normative content, has demonstrated that this right has presented a challenge to IHRL. Despite 
the right’s codification more than sixty years ago via Article 20(2) of the ICCPR, its normative 
content remains largely unsettled and underdeveloped. The four internal features of the right 
have played an influential role in shaping its difficult evolution within IHRL. The translation of the 
claim to be, or interest in being, free from the harm of hate speech into an international human 
right carries significant interpretive and implementation challenges. While Article 20(2) 
established a strong international legal norm obliging, and not just authorizing, states to prohibit 
by law the expressive acts described therein, four intrinsic qualities of that norm subsequently 
contributed to its lack of a coherent and universal meaning. These are: the emotional component; 
the incitement component; tensions between speakers’ and listeners’ rights to liberty and 
equality; and the group-identity component. 
 
While these four internal features of the right to be free from the harm of hate speech have 
influenced the difficult path the right has taken so far in its evolution within IHRL, they also shape 
the right’s prospects for further development and inform its expansive potential. Drawing upon 
the analysis of the right’s four internal features, this paper submits that any possible efforts to 
create new international standards against hate speech that aim to expand the right’s normative 
core by adding specificity to the content and effects of the proscribed expressions pursuant to it 
will confront multiple difficulties. 
 
States’ polarized positions on how to address the complex definitional challenges and tensions 
underlying the four internal features of the international norm against hate speech constitute a 
significant obstacle to its expansive capacity. Both during the drafting of Article 20(2) and during 
the recent standard-setting attempts in the area of religious hate speech, it became clear that 
efforts to reach a wide agreement among states on how to regulate hate speech under IHRL would 
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ultimately reach an impasse. Moreover, the weaknesses and interpretational gaps that 
characterize supra-national hate speech jurisprudence indicate that any possible standard-setting 
efforts would be confronted by a dearth of clear and well-established sets of principles that could 
be built upon or developed in the form of new international standards. 
 
The existence of a minimum level of uniformity across a critical mass of states in implementing 
and interpreting the original obligatory standard established by Article 20(2) is essential for the 
development of new international standards against hate speech. However, national approaches 
to hate speech regulation show significant variations across states that apply different criteria, in 
both legislative patterns and judicial practices, to define the threshold between free speech and 
hate speech. The OHCHR recently affirmed this, after its comprehensive assessment of the state of 
implementation of the prohibition of incitement to national, racial, or religious discrimination, 
hostility, or violence, as outlined in Article 20(2) of the ICCPR, in a variety of countries around the 
world.20  NGO ARTICLE 19 after undertaking a similar assessment of the laws and jurisprudence on 
hate speech across countries in different regions of the world characterized them as a ‘patchwork’ 
where it found significant variations ‘in how prohibition and threshold of incitement is approached 
and defined in laws and regulations, and in how these concepts are applied.’21 
 
Drawing upon this paper’s analysis of the internal features of the right to be free from the harm of 
hate speech, it is clear that both the ‘emotional’ and incitement components of the right make the 
right’s interpretation and implementation largely contextual. Furthermore, legal traditions across 
states resolve the two sources of tensions that the right embodies between speakers’ and 
listeners’ rights to equality and liberty, as well as individual and group rights, differently. These 
differences emanate from the legal traditions’ biases to either egalitarian or libertarian notions of 
freedom of expression, and their different levels of commitment to the advancement of group 
rights. Consequently, this leads to varied delineations of the meaning and scope of the right to be 
free from the harm of hate speech across countries that are shaped by, in addition to the various 
legal traditions, cumulative practical experiences and particularized political, cultural, and 
historical national settings. More specifically, the legislative patterns and judicial practices of the 
resolution of the hate speech problem are predicated upon different conceptions of: the content 
of prohibited expressions; the scope of recognized harms of hate speech; the extension of the 
right’s protection to groups and to group-defining characteristics; the range of groups protected; 
and the standards of causality between advocacy of hatred and its alleged harms. The prohibition 
of advocacy of hatred that constitutes clear and unambiguous incitement to immediate violence 
or illegal acts is the aspect of the right to be free from the harm of hate speech that enjoys 
transnational resonance, since it easily crosses cultural and ideological boundaries. However, the 
legal regulation of advocacy of hatred that falls short of incitement to violence but does create a 
                                                  
20
 “Rabat Plan of Action on the Prohibition of Advocacy of National, Racial or Religious Hatred That Constitutes 
Incitement to Discrimination, Hostility or Violence,” October 5, 2012, para. 11, http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/ 
Issues/Opinion/SeminarRabat/Rabat_draft_outcome.pdf. 
21
 Henry Maina, “The Prohibition of Incitement to Hatred in Africa: Comparative Review and Proposal for a Threshold” 
(presented at the OHCHR Expert workshops on the prohibition of incitement to national, racial or religious hatred, 
Workshop for Africa, Nairobi, 2011), http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/FreedomOpinion/Articles19-20/Pages/Experts 
PapersNairobi.aspx; Anges Callamard, “Towards an Interpretation of Article 20 of the ICCPR: Thresholds for the 
Prohibition of Incitement to Hatred” (presented at the OHCHR Expert workshops on the prohibition of incitement to 
national, racial or religious hatred, Vienna, 2011), http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/Expression/ICCPR/Vienna/ 
CRP7Callamard.pdf; Sim Kok Eng Amy, “Preventing Hatred or Silencing Voices: Making the Case for a Rigorous Threshold 
for the Incitement to National, Racial or Religious Hatred” (presented at the OHCHR Expert workshops on the prohibition 
of incitement to national, racial or religious hatred, Workshop for Asia Pacific, Bangkok, 2011), http://www.ohchr.org/ 
Documents/Issues/Expression/ICCPR/Bangkok/AmySim.pdf; Paula Martins, “Freedom of Expression and Equality: The 
Prohibition of Incitement to Hatred in Latin America,” 2011, http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/Expression/ 
ICCPR/Santiago/PaulaMartins.pdf. 
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social climate conducive to hostility and discrimination does not enjoy the same universal 
resonance. Instead, it is subject to different states’ approaches. 
 
There is no doubt that the right to be free from the harm of hate speech has so far resisted 
substantive evolution and refinement. However, states are still in need of further guidance in the 
resolution of boundary disputes in hate speech regulation, especially in light of the current 
globalizing context of hate speech which poses a new set of human rights challenges. After its 
recent examination of the state of implementation of Article 20(2) of the ICCPR worldwide, the 
OHCHR has characterized legislations in the area of hate speech as often ‘excessively narrow or 
vague’ and has characterized related jurisprudence as ‘scarce and ad hoc’.22 Furthermore, the 
OHCHR has noted the existence of a ‘dichotomy’ between the lack of prosecution of actual 
incitement cases and ‘persecution of minorities under the guise of domestic incitement laws’.23  
After making a similar assessment, the NGO ARTICLE 19 characterized laws related to incitement 
as ‘inconsistent and vague in their application’. It furthermore characterized the available 
jurisprudence at national levels as ‘vague, ad hoc and possibly lacking in conceptual discipline or 
rigour.’24  As Frank La Rue, the UN Special Rapporteur on freedom of expression, rightly notes, the 
different national regulatory responses to hate speech are ‘symptomatic of the unclear 
[international] normative environment surrounding the issue.’25 As this paper has illustrated, the 
scant guidance supra-national jurisprudence on hate speech has provided on the interpretation of 
the international norm against hate speech has compounded the definitional uncertainties of this 
norm. The ambiguities that surround the interpretation and implementation of the international 
norm against hate speech open the door to excessive prohibitions, inconsistent implementation 
and restrictive interpretations, without effective scrutiny from supra-national monitoring bodies.26 
 
In order to address the resistance of the international norm against hate speech to substantive 
evolution, efforts aiming to further develop this norm, in response to contemporary hate speech 
challenges, can be directed toward approaches that place less emphasis on legal and textual 
development and more on providing practical guidance to states about implementing the norm. 
Given the formulation of the right to be free from the harm of hate speech, any new international 
binding standards against hate speech would oblige states to add new elements to their national 
offences, incurring liability on speakers engaging in hate speech. However, the possible margin of 
agreement among states on the legal measures for addressing hate speech is very narrow. 
Moreover, the interaction of the various rights and interests involved in hate speech regulation 
presents scenarios and complications that are so rich and diverse that a ready-made formula to 
resolve them universally is hardly feasible. Indeed, appeals to context frequently arose during the 
right’s drafting history and in recent UN debates. Supra-national human rights monitoring bodies 
also largely endorsed these appeals, which seemed to function as valid reasons for favouring one 
normative interpretation of the right over another.  
 
Despite the limited expansive potential of the international norm against hate speech, the greater 
visibility it has acquired within the lexicon of IHRL has created the momentum to develop a set of 
principles providing practical guidance to states on how to draw the line between freedom of 
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data/files/medialibrary/3572/12-12-01-PO-incitement-WEB.pdf. 
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expression and prohibited incitement. The elaboration of guiding principles on the 
implementation of the right to be free from the harm of hate speech, that transcend contextual 
considerations or that are sufficiently open to accommodate highly relevant contextual variables, 
present one solution for bypassing political impasses on the right’s substantive evolution. This 
would add much-needed discipline, consistency and rigor to the methodologies that courts 
employ to reach their rulings on hate speech cases, and can also guide legislators in drafting 
relevant hate speech offences in their national legislations. 
 
The ‘Rabat Plan of Action on the prohibition of advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred that 
constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence’,27 which the OHCHR issued in 2012, 
can be considered the basis for consensual guiding principles, if built upon. The plan proposed a 
six-part threshold test as a framework for the implementation of the right to be free from the 
harm of hate speech or determining expressions that warrant prohibition under Article 20(2) of 
the ICCPR. A number of UN Special Rapporteurs, human rights experts and NGOs have endorsed 
this threshold test,28 which is composed of the following six elements. First, the social and political 
context prevalent at the time the expression was made and disseminated, in terms of the 
existence of conflicts or tensions within society, among groups; present or historic acts of violence 
or discrimination targeting members of particular groups; or frequent negative stereotyping of 
particular groups. Second, the speaker, in terms of his position or status and his influence or 
authority over the audience. Third, the intent, which could be indicated by analysing the language 
the speaker uses, as well as the scale and repetition of expressions. Fourth, the content of 
expression, in terms of the degree to which the expression was provocative and direct; the 
severity of the harm advocated; and the form, style, and nature of the arguments used. Fifth, the 
extent of speech, in terms of its reach, public nature, magnitude, frequency and the medium of 
dissemination.  Sixth, the likelihood of the occurrence of the harm in terms of the existence of its 
degree of risk and reasonable probability. 
 
These six criteria, designed to assist states with the establishment of boundaries between freedom 
of expression and prohibited incitement under Article 20(2), represent a true opportunity for a 
systematic engagement with some of the challenging aspects of the right to be free from the harm 
of hate speech. They can serve as a focal point to bring international players away from political 
posturing and towards convergence on a focused agenda, helping granting the right a streamlined 
or harmonious interpretation and implementation. In contrast to the creation of international 
substantive standards outlining the content of prohibited expressions and their undesired harms 
pursuant to the right, the procedural development of the right, or outlining the basic guarantees 
for its realization, is not overloaded with navigational challenges. This procedural approach could 
substitute a strong normative content to the right that is universal or consensual. 
 
The articulation of guiding principles for determining whether certain expressions are prohibited 
pursuant to the international norm against hate speech, that leave enough room for a contextual 
assessment, could be the way forward to further develop the norm and enhance its realization 
since such principles could garner wide endorsement from states.  The specification of procedural 
aspects of the legal interpretation of the international norm against hate speech helps to maintain 
and protect a minimum universal core of this norm, instead of the mere acceptance of the norm’s 
fragmentation into separate historically-based, culturally-defined, politically-shaped, and country-
specific approaches. 
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This paper has shed light on the significant difficulties facing the development, strengthening and 
expansion of the international norm against hate speech. It has provided an explanatory 
framework through which to understand the origins and the causes of core challenges facing the 
evolution of the international norm against hate speech. It contends that four internal features of 
this norm (the emotional component, the incitement component, tensions between speakers’ and 
listeners’ rights to liberty and equality, and the group-identity component) have a strong and 
direct influence on understanding the difficult path the norm has taken in its evolution within 
IHRL. 
 
This analysis has illustrated the importance of examining the role that the internal features of 
international human rights could have in influencing their normative evolution. It provides a 
framework from which further reflection and scholarship on the right to be free from the harm of 
hate speech, and by extension on the evolution of other human rights, can emerge. The 
examination of the push and pull factors for normative evolution in IHRL have not yet featured as 
a major research question within international relations and international law disciplines. 
Additional empirical studies on this area of research, which focus not only on cases that witnessed 
successful normative evolution but also on cases in which such evolution seems to face serious 
obstacles or resistance, is needed to contribute to its theoretical development. As the human 
rights challenges that have global dimensions, and thus global impact, grow, questions about the 
normative expansion of the existing international human rights framework also acquire significant 
policy relevance. Explaining the internal and external dynamics of normative evolution in the 
context of IHRL is crucial to the identification of its conditions and consequently to the formulation 
of strategies for different stakeholders that can shape and influence such an evolution.  
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